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The Oslo Accords: More than Israel Deserves
John Quigley'
The agreements concluded between the Palestine Liberation Organization
("P.L.O.") and Israel beginning in 1993 hold the prospect of bringing resolution
to the long-standing territorial dispute over Palestine. Commonly called Oslo 1,
and based on negotiations in the capital city of Norway, the Declaration of Princi-
ples (1993) is the first such agreement The Declaration called for future negotia-
tion on the major outstanding issues after an interim period during which the
P.L.O. would administer some of the Palestinian territory (Gaza Strip and West
Bank of the Jordan River) occupied by Israel.I
The two parties concluded additional agreements, none in Norway, but none-
theless carrying the "Oslo" name because of the location of the first set of nego-
tiations. The name Oslo 2 attaches to a 1995 agreement defining the terms under
which the P.L.O. carries out that partial administration. The name Oslo 3 refers
to a 1997 agreement on the terms of Israel's partial withdrawal from the town of
Hebron. Oslo 3 also revised the timetable for Israeli withdraxal from additional
areas, originally set forth in Oslo 2.
3
The Oslo agreements offer the Palestinians much less than that to which they
are legally entitled. For as long as history records, the Palestinians have been the
majority population in Palestine. They descended from the ancient Canaanites
who formed the majority population, even during the brief periods when the He-
brews controlled certain areas. After World War I, with Great Britain adminis-
tering Palestine by arrangement with the League of Nations, Jews migrated to
* Professor of Law, Ohio State University. LL.B., M.A. 1966, Harvard Law School.
1. Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements, Sept 13,
1993, 32 I.L.M. 1525 (1993).
2. Interim Agreement on the West Bank and Gaza Strip, Sept 28, 1995, Isr.-Pal. The
1995 interim agreement replaced a 1994 interim agreement under wich the P.L.O. ad-
ministered most of the Gaza Strip, plus the area around the tonm of Jericho in the West
Bank, see Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area, Cairo, May 4, 1994, Isr.-Pal.,
reprinted in 7 PALESTrNE Y. B. INT'L L. 243 (1992-94).
3. Mideast Accord; Looking Ahead: Two U.S. Documents, N.Y. Ti.Ms, Jan. 17,
1997, at A12 (giving the text of a document headed Notes for the Record drafted at the re-
quest of Mr. Netanyahu and Mr. Arafat by a U.S. representative to summarize points
agreed to between them).
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Palestine in large numbers. After World War II, the major powers, acting through
the United Nations General Assembly, proposed splitting Palestine into two states.
Under this plan, most of Palestine would have gone to a Jewish state, even though
Jews made up only 30% of Palestine's population.
4
When the Palestinian Arabs objected to this plan, an army organized to estab-
lish a Jewish state in Palestine seized 80% of its territory in 1948, expelling most
of the Palestinian Arabs from the sectors taken. The document declaring Jewish
statehood cited the U.N. General Assembly's partition proposal as its primary le-
gal base.6 That proposal, however, was not framed as a disposition of territory.
Instead, the proposal was a recommendation to the two parties by the U.N. Gen-
eral Assembly, which, moreover, had no power to dispose of territory.7 The pro-
posal was not generally regarded as having binding force.
8
The document declaring Jewish statehood also cited Jewish historic rights in
Palestine, a reference to control of part of Palestine by Hebrew rulers in ancient
times, as an additional legal base for statehood.9 International law generally does
4. G.A. Res. 181, U.N. GAOR, 2d Sess., U.N. Doc. A/519 (1947); see also Summary
Records ofMeetings 21 September-8 December 1948, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., Part I, C. 1, at
802, U.N. Doc. A/C.1/SR.226 (1948) (statement of Mr. Dihigo, Cuba,) (explaining eight
reasons why Cuba had voted against res. 181 in November 1947: (1) that the resolution
exceeded the General Assembly's powers of recommendation; (2) that it violated the
clause in the U.K.'s interwar mandate over Palestine, specifically, that admission of Jews
was not to infringe the rights of the Arabs; (3) that the majority of U.N. members had
failed to respect the views of the nearly one-third minority that opposed the resolution; (4)
that there had been no basis for the U.K.'s Balfour Declaration of 1917 that advocated a
Jewish national home in Palestine; (5) that the Balfour Declaration did not promise a Jew-
ish state but merely a national home provided that it did not affect the rights of the Arab
majority, (6) that the resolution was unjust because it gave to a group of foreign Jewish
immigrants a part of the territory of Palestine that belonged to the Arabs for centuries; (7)
that partitioning Palestine would not solve the problem of the displaced Jews; (8) and that
it was wrong to make the Arabs suffer to repair the wrongs that other nations had done to
the Jews.).
5. JOHN QuiGLEY, PALESn AND ISRAEL: A CHALLENGE TO JUSTICE 3-93 (1990).
6. Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel, I LAwS OF THE STATE OF
ISRAEL 3 (1948).
7. QuiGLEY, supra note 5, at 32-39.
8. See Summary Records of Meetings 21 September-8 December 1948, U.N. GAOR,
3d Sess., Pt. I, C.1, at 746, U.N. Doc. A/C.1/SR.226 (1948) (offering statements for the
proposition that the petition proposal was merely a recommendation); Mr. Federspiel,
Denmark: 'Trom the legal point of view, the Assembly clearly could not establish any right
for any group in Palestine, since it could only make recommendations and set up organs for
the purpose of putting those recommendations into effect." id. at 746-47; Mr. El-Khouri,
Syria, referring with approval to quoted remark of representative of Denmark, id. at 802;
Mr. Dihigo, Cuba, stating, with reference to resolution 181 that General Assembly has
right of recommendation only, id. at 808; Mr. Beeley, U.K., referring to resolution 181:
"[W]hile the Assembly's resolutions constituted recommendations, and had moral weight,
they certainly were not law." id.
9. Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel, supra note 6, at 3.
[VOL. 12:2
RESPONSE TO BERES
not recognize such a base where there has been intervening occupation and con-
trol by others for many centuries.' 0 Moreover, even if such a concept were ac-
cepted in law, a line of descent has not been established between the Hebrews of
ancient Palestine and modem-day Jewry. 11
In 1967, Israel captured the remainig 20% of Palestine (Gaza Strip and West
Bank), in hostilities initiated by Israel.2 At the outset, Israel claimed falsely that
Egypt started the hostilities, a claim Israel later withdrew after the fighting
ended. 13 In fact, several Israeli leaders later said that when the Israeli cabinet
made the decision to invade Egypt, cabinet members understood that Israel faced
no imminent invasion by Egypt.14 During the 1967 hostilities, Israel expelled
thousands more Arabs, and in the following decades settled thousands of its own
citizens in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.
15
Now, Israel and the Palestinians, represented by the P.L.O., are discussing the
extent to which the Palestinians will control the 20% of Palestine that Israel took
in 1967. The 80% taken by Israel in 1948 is not on the table. Israeli Prime Min-
ister Benjamin Netanyahu asserts that the Palestinian entity will not be a state.
Israel's stated positions on these issues are far from what is required by intema-
10. Minquiers and Ecrehos Case (France v. U.K.), 1953 LC.J. 47, at 56 (Nov. 17,
1953) (rejecting claim by France of "original feudal title" to territory subsequently occu-
pied by Britain).
11. QUIGLEY, supra note 5, at 66-72.
12. RrrcHmOvENDALE, THE ORiGis oF mARAB-IsAu IWARS 180 (1934).
13. See U.N. SCOR, 22nd Sess., 1348th mtg., at 15, U.N. Doc. SIPV.1348 (1967)
(detailing the escalation in the conflict between Egypt and Israel, according to Israel's per-
spective). Mr. Eban, Israel:
[O]n the morning of 5 June, mten Eg)ptian forces engaged us by air and land, bombarding thz %il-
lages of Kissufin, Nahal-Oz and Ein Hashelosha we knew that our limit of safety had bz=n readed,
and perhaps passed. In accordance ,ith its inherent right of edf-fence as formulated in Article 51 of
the United Nations Charter, Israel responded defensively in full strength ....
Id. Mr. Eban further stated that "approaching Egyptian aircraft appeared on our radar
screens." Id. See also Admission on Attack, Tnwms (Lo\oN), July 8, 1967, at 3, col. 7
(stating that Eshkol "buried the often-repeated statement that Egyptian [air] and land
forces attacked Israel before she launched her devastating lightning offensive on June 5").
14. Le general Rabin ne pense pas que Nasser voulait la guerre, LE Mocms, Feb. 29,
1968, at 1 (quoting Chief of Staff General Itzhak Rabin as saying, "I do not believe that
[Egyptian President Gamel Abdul] Nasser manted var. The two divisions he sent into Si-
nai on May 14 would not have been enough to unleash an offensive against Israel. He
knew it and Ave knev it"); Amnon Kapeliouk, Israel dtait-il rdellement menace
d'extermination?, LE MoNDE, June 3, 1972, at 4 (quoting General Matitiahu Peled, a
member of the general staff, as saying that the "thesis according to .iIch the danger of
genocide weighed on us in June 1967, and that Israel struggled for its physical existence is
only a bluff bom and developed after the vmr."); Excerpts from Begin Speech at National
Defense College, N.Y. Tnhms, Aug. 21, 1982, at A6 (quoting Menachem Begin, who had
been a cabinet minister in 1967, "In June 1967, we again had a choice. The Egyptian Army
concentrations in the Sinai approaches do not prove that Nasser vms really about to attack
us. We must be honest with ourselves. We decided to attack him.").
15. QUiGLEY, supra note 5, at 161-173.
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tional norms to make the Palestinians whole. Regarding Israeli settlements, Israel
says it will not remove them. Regarding Jerusalem, over which Israel has no
claim beyond naked control,16 Israel says it will not give any role in governance
to the Palestinians. Regarding the return of the Palestinian refugees, Israel does
not plan to repatriate any of them.
According to Professor Louis Rend Beres, writing in this journal issue,17 the
Oslo bargain is not good enough for Israel. He would have Israel keep all of Pal-
estine. Professor Beres adduces legal postulates to substantiate his position. He
argues that Israel not only should, but legally must, abrogate the Oslo agreements.
Professor Beres' primary contention is that the P.L.O. is a terrorist organization,
and that states have an obligation to punish terrorists. Given this obligation, it
was unlawful for Israel to enter into an agreement that rewards, instead of pun-
ishes, those who committed terrorist acts. To prove his thesis that Israel must ab-
rogate the Oslo agreements, Professor Beres relies on a number of legal doctrines
that he uses in conjunction with certain factual assumptions.
1. THE LEGAL CHARACTER OF THE OSLO AGREEMENTS
In support of Israel's abrogation of the Oslo agreements, Professor Beres first
contends that the agreements are not instruments that have standing in interna-
tional law. According to Beres, the Oslo agreements are not treaties, hence not
binding, because the P.L.O. does not represent a state. He writes, "According to
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, a treaty is always an international
agreement 'concluded between States'. This is an apparent reference to Article
2 of the Vienna Convention, which defines "treaty," for purposes of the Conven-
tion, as an agreement between states.20 Professor Beres ignores Article 3 of the
Vienna Convention, which says, "The fact that the present Convention does not
apply to international agreements concluded between States and other sub ects of
international law ... shall not affect the legal force of such agreements."2 Thus,
according to the Vienna Convention, one may have a binding international
agreement between a state party and a non-state party, so long as the latter quali-
fies as a subject of international law.
An organization representing a people entitled to self-determination is a sub-
ject of international law.2 In the words of one noted writer on the topic, "national
liberation movements are given international status on account of their political
16. John Quigley, Sovereignty in Jerusalem, 45 CATH. U. L. Rev. 765, 765-780
(1996).
17. Louis Ren6 Beres, Why the Oslo Accords Should Be Abrogated by Israel, 12 AM
U. J. INT'L L & POL'Y 267 (1997).
18. Id. at267.
19. Id. n.2.
20. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 2, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
21. Id. art. 3.
22. H. WILsoN, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE UsE OF FORCE BY NATIONAL LIBERATION
Mov mE,,'s 117-123 (1988).
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goals: their struggle to free themselves from colonial domination, a racist regime
or alien occupation."23 The P.L.O. opposes the "alien occupation" of the Gaza
Strip and West Bank. The U.N. General Assembly has recognized the Palestinian
.24people as entitled to self-determination, and the P.L.O. as its representative in
that regard. 25
National liberation movements have concluded treaties with states.26 Beyond
the P.L.O.'s recognition as a national liberation movement, Palestine has a history
of concluding treaties. During the interwar period, Palestine was administered by
Great Britain as a mandate territory under a system established by the League of
Nations.2 7 Populations of mandate territories were regarded as subjects of inter-
national law. "Communities under mandate," according to a 1931 statement of
the Institute of International Law, were "subjects of international law," since they
held "a patrimony distinct from that of the Mandatory State."  The Institute said
that mandate communities could acquire rights and be held to their obligations.2
Palestine, while administered by Great Britain, concluded a variety of multilateral
and bilateral treaties.
30
Professor Beres writes that the Oslo agreements are invalid under international
law, and therefore that the Palestinian party "cannot be held jurisprudentially to
the same standard of accountability as the State of IsraeL" 31 If Professor Beres
were correct that the agreements are invalid, then neither side would be bound
under international law. Whatever binding force the agreements may have applies
equally to the two parties. Since both parties are subjects of international law, and
since the agreements reflect an intent to be bound, both are bound.
Professor Beres assumes without discussion that the Palestinian party is not a
23. ANTONIoCA5BsE, ThTENATIONALLAWINADVIDEDWORLD 91 (1986).
24. GA Res. 3236, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 31 at 4, U.N. Doe. A/9631
(1974).
25. GA Res. 3237, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 31 at 4, U.N. Doc. A/9631
(1974). Professor Beres incorrectly refers to "the Palestine Authority (PA) that is the non-
state party to Oslo I and IL" As he correctly states elseniere, the Palestinian party v,as the
P.L.O. When Oslo 1 was signed, the Palestinian Authority did not exist It -was established
only after Oslo 1, to administer the areas over v.wich Israel %,,as ceding partial control.
26. Julio A. Barberis, Nouvelles questions concerant la personallit juridique inter-
nationale, 179 Recueil des cours (Hague Academy of International Law) 145, 259-64
(1983).
27. Mandate for Palestine, Permanent Mandates Commission no. 466, League of Na-
tions Doc. C.529.M.314.1922.VI and C.667.M.396.1922.VI (1922). 8 LEAGu oF NATIo:.S,
OFFIcmI Jouma 1007 (1922), reprinted in Terms of League of Nations Aandates: Re-
published by the United Nations, U.N. Doc. A/70 (1946).
28. James BrowNn Scott, The Two Institutes of International Lmsw 26 A. J. ITrr'L L.
87, 91 (1932) (giving text of institute's resolution on mandates).
29. Id.
30. See Richard Wilner, Nationalist Aovements and the Middle East Peace Process:
Exercises in Self-Determination, 1 U.C. DAvIsJ. Ift'LL. & POL'Y 297,313 (1995).
31. Beres, supra note 17, at 268 n.3.
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state. That issue, however, requires discussion. The West Bank and Gaza Strip are
under Israel's belligerent occupation. Territory under belligerent occupation is not
under the sovereignty of the occupying power, and Israel has not claimed sover-
eignty in the West Bank, with the exception of the sector of Jerusalem it occupied,
and the Golan Heights. Egypt held the Gaza Strip from 1948 until Israel took it
in 1967, but Egypt deemed the Gaza Strip to be part of Palestine. 33 Egypt consid-
ered that it was holding Gaza pending the emergence of a Palestine state.
3 4
Jordan held the West Bank from 1948 to 1967 and incorporated it in 1950,
claiming sovereignty subject to the future emergence of a Palestine state.3 In
1988, the Palestine National Council (P.N.C.) declared statehood for Palestine, at
which point Jordan renounced its 1950 claim.36 Given the P.N.C.'s declaration of
statehood and substantial international recognition thereof, and given that none of
the other states claim sovereignty, sovereignty must reside in a Palestine state. A
state whose territory is occupied by a foreign army is nonetheless a state.
2. VIOLATION OF A PEREMPTORY NORM
Professor Beres writes that even if the P.L.O. were proper as a treaty partner,
the Oslo agreements would still be invalid, because they conflict with a peremp-
tory norm of international law. He refers to the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, which says that a treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it con-
32. These claims have been condemned by the international community as violations
of the legal regime of belligerent occupation. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 252, U.N. SCOR, 23d
Sess., Res. & Decs. 9, U.N. Doc. S/INF/23/Rev.1 (1968) (condemning Israeli measures
affecting Jerusalem as tantamount to annexation, which the resolution found unlawful for a
belligerent occupant); S.C. Res. 478, U.N. SCOR, 35th Sess., Res. & Decs. 14, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/478 (1980), and G.A. Res. 35/169(E), U.N. GAOR, 35th Sess., Res. 28, U.N. Doc.
A/35/48 (1980) (both condemning a 1980 Israeli statute that proclaimed both sectors of
Jerusalem to be Israel's capital).
33. Carol Farhi, On the Legal Status of the Gaza Strip, in 1 MILrrARY GOVERMENT IN
THE TERRToRmS ADMsTERED BY ISRAEL: THE LEGAL ASPECTS 1967-1980 61, 75 (1982).
34. Republican Decree Announcing Constitutional System of Gaza Sector, 17 MIDDLE
EAST J. 156 (1963) (March 9, 1962, art. 1) (constitution adopted for Gaza by Egypt in 1962
stated: "The Gaza Strip is an indivisible part of the land of Palestine."; see also id. art. 73
(stating "This constitution shall continue to be observed in the Gaza Strip until a perma-
nent constitution for the state of Palestine is issued.")
35. Albion Ross, Amman Parliament Vote Unites Arab Palestine and Transjordan,
N.Y. TIMEs, April 25, 1950, at Al (stating that Jordan's parliament specified that in incor-
porating the West Bank into Jordan, it acted "without prejudicing the final settlement of
Palestine's just case within the sphere of national aspirations, inter-Arab co-operation and
international justice.").
36. John Kifaer, Hussein Surrenders Claims on West Bank to the P.L.O., N.Y. TIIis,
Aug. 1, 1988, at Al; Excerpts from Hussein's address on abandoning claims to the West
Bank, N.Y. Tams, Aug, 1, 1988, at A4 (stating "The independent Palestinian state will be
established on the occupied Palestinian land after its liberation.").
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flicts with a norm accepted as one from which no derogation is permitted.s7 Pro-
fessor Beres' basis for concluding that the Oslo agreements violate such a per-
emptory norm is as follows:
[A]s the nonstate party in this case just happens to be a terrorist organization
whose leaders must be punished for their egregious crimes, any agreement with
this party that offers rewards rather than punishments is entirely null and void.
Significantly, in view of the peremptory expectation kmon in law as Nuflhm
crimen sine poena, "No crime without a punishment," the state party in such an
agreement - here the State of Israel - violates international law by honoring the
This reasoning is questionable on several grounds. First, Professor Beres uses
the personal acts of leadership individuals to conclude that their state is not a fit
treaty partner. He confuses the personal responsibility of individuals with the
status of the entity, whether the entity be a state or a national liberation move-
ment If individuals commit unlawful acts in the course of a military conflict, they
can be prosecuted, yet treaties can be concluded with the party they represented,
in order to terminate the conflict 39 Otherwise, conflicts during which individuals
commit criminal conduct could never be ended by a treaty.
40
As to the type of peremptory norm involved, Professor Beres says it is a norm
of international law that all criminal offenses must be punished by a state capable
of doing so.41 States must prosecute persons guilty of serious atrocities, at least
those qualifying as grave breaches of the laws of warfare, 4 and these might cover
some of the acts Professor Beres has in mind. There is, however, no norm requir-
ing states to punish acts qualifying as "terrorist," a term that, in any event, has no
internationally accepted definition.
Professor Beres apparently finds an agreement with a terrorist organization
unlawful only if the agreement offers a "reward." 43 This approach is not found in
existing international law, and Professor Beres provides no grounding for it. He
does not make clear whether he means rewards to the state (or nonstate entity) or
rewards to the individuals responsible for criminal acts. "Reward," moreover, is a
questionable criterion. Are the agreements with Germany and Japan ending the
37. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 20, art. 53. Beres, supra
note 17, at n.2.
38. Id. at 2.
39. Id.
40. Croatia - Federal Republic of Yugoslavia Agreement on the Normalization of Re-
lations, Aug. 23, 1996, 35 IL.M. 1219, 1221.
41. Beres, supra note 17, at 268-69.
42. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Civilian Persons in Time of War,
Aug. 12, 1949, art. 146, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, 386 ("Each High Contracting Party shal be un-
der the obligation to search for persons alleged to have committed, or to have ordered to be
committed, ... grave breaches, and shall bring such persons, regardless of their nationality,
before its own courts."); see also id. at 318, art. 47 (defining "grave breaches).
43. Beres, supra note 17, at 269.
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Second World War unlawful because, as it turned out, the fact that they did not
compete militarily in the postwar period allowed them to become economic gi-
ants?4 One person's reward is another's detriment. The rule Professor Beres pro-
poses would result in endless debate about whether a particular agreement was
beneficial to a particular party.
The Oslo agreements are a case in point. Professor Beres makes the bald
statement quoted above that the Oslo agreements offered "rewards" to a terrorist
organization.45 This "reward" is a matter of interpretation. 46 Professor Beres does
not define "terrorist organization" or discuss what types of force by an organiza-
tion like the P.L.O. would be prohibited. As an organization internationally rec-
ognized as representing a people entitled to self-determination, the P.L.O. may
lawfully direct force against military targets in pursuit of self-determination. Only
those instances of force directed against civilians would remain unlawful. It is un-
clear how much unlawful force Professor Beres would require before affixing the
"terrorist" label.
Moreover, if one were to deny validity to an agreement of an entity whose
leaders committed criminal acts, one would have to ask whether that might not be
true of the Israeli party as well. In his autobiography, Mr. Rabin acknowledged
his central role as an officer of the Israel Defense Force in expelling the inhabi-
tants of the central Palestine towns of Lydda and Ramleh in July 1948, sending
approximately 60,000 onto the roads virtually at gunpoint with what they could
carry. 47 At the Nuremberg trials, acts of expulsion were charged as crimes against
humanity. Indeed, when Israel tried Adolf Eichmann, it alleged acts of expulsion
of civilian populations as "war crimes" and "crimes against humanity."'4 8 In 1948,
44. See Daniel S. Greenberg, Too Much for Pentagon Research, WASH. POST, Oct. 10,
1995, at Al3.
45. Beres, supra note 17, at 269.
46. Even if one could say that the P.L.O. is being rewarded, the groups that operated
under the P.L.O. umbrella that most frequently employed unlawful force opposed the Oslo
agreements and thus would probably not qualify as being "rewarded." The P.L.O. that ne-
gotiated the Oslo agreements was effectively the FATAH organization.
47. Benny Morris, 1948 ANDAr=R: ISRAEL AND THEPALEsTNmNs 2 (1990) (reporting
order issued July 12, 1948, by Lt.-Col. Yitzhak Rabin: "The inhabitants of Lydda must be
expelled quickly without attention to age. They should be directed towards Beit Nabala....
Implement immediately," and a similar simultaneous order relating to adjacent town of
Ramleh); David K. Shipler, Israel bars Rabin from relating '48 eviction of Arabs, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 23, 1979, at A23 (stating that in Rabin's draft of autobiography he wrote that
before expelling the inhabitants he asked David Ben-Gurion whether it should really be
done, and that Ben-Gurion by a wave of the hand signaled that he wanted the inhabitants
out; stating also that this passage was removed from the draft by Israeli censors); see also
Benny Morris, Operation Dani and the Palestinian Exodus from Lydda and Ramle in
1948, 40 MIDDLE EAST J. 82, 96 (1986); Fouzi EL-ASmAR, TO BE AN ARAB rN ISRAEL 4-13
(1978); EDGAR O'BALLANCE, TIE ARAB-ISRAELI WAR, 1948 147 (1956).
48. Attorney-General of the Government of Israel v. Adolf Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. 5, 8-9
(Cr.C. (Jm.) 1961) (counts 3, 5, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 of the indictment); see also id. at 95-102
(reciting facts of expulsions found to have been carried out or planned by Eichmann).
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the Central Intelligence Agency, reporting from Palestine, used the term "terror-
ist' to describe the tactics of Jewish militia aimed at intimidating Palestinian ci-
vilians into fleeing from the country. 49 In 1988, Rabin, as head of the Israeli
military forces opposing an uprising by the Palestinian civilian population, put
into practice a policy of breaking the bones of Palestinian youths caught for stone
throwing.50 This policy, which probably constituted a grave breach of the Geneva
Civilians Convention, is also an internationally cognizable crime.51 By Professor
Beres' analysis, then, if Israel is getting a "reward" from the Oslo agreements, as
it is, the P.L.O. must abrogate them in order to avoid profiting an unworthy treaty
partner.
3. CHANGED CIRCUMSTANCES AS A BASIS FOR ABROGATION
Professor Beres further argues that even if the Oslo agreements were initially
lawful, circumstances have changed since their signing, giving Israel "substantial
rights of abrogation," 52 and "augment[ing] Israel's obligations to cease compli-
ance with Oslo."53 He writes that Israel's obligation to comply "ended promptly
when a fundamental change occurred in those circumstances that existed at the
effective dates of the accord and whose continuance formed a tacit condition of
the accords' ongoing validity. This change, of course, involved multiple material
breaches by the P.L.O., especially those concerning control of anti-Israel terrorism
49. Report by the Central Intelligence Agency. Secret Possible Developments in Pal-
estine, Feb. 28, 1948, 5 For. ReL U.S. 1948 at 666, 672 (1976) (describing attacks by the
Haganah on Arab villages as "terrorist raids against the Arabs similar in tactics to those of
the Irgun Zvai Leumi and the Stem Gang [LlI].") The latter two groups were other Jev,-
ish militia, whose tactics the C.IA. is also here characterizing as terrorist. When Israeli
statehood was declared, the three militia merged to form Israel's army, the Israeli Defense
Force. Under principles of state responsibility, a new state is liable for acts of militia
whose activity led to its creation; IAN BRovaNm, STATE REsFoNslnI.ITY, PARI 178 (1983)
(finding "a categorical imposition of responsibility for all acts of the insurgent forces").
50. John Kifner, Israeli Officers Ordered to Watch Tape of 4 Soldiers Beating Arabs,
N.Y. Tams, Feb. 29, 1988, atAl, col 4. See also U.S. Dept. of State, Country Reports on
Human Rights Practices for 1988 1377 (1989); The Casualties of Conflict: Medical Care
and Human Rights in the West Bank and Gaza Strip: Report of a Medical Fact Finding
Mission by Physicians for Human Rights 11 (Somerville, Mass., Mar. 30, 1988) (discuss-
ing the U.S. medical team examination of 58 hospital patients wiao claimed injury from
IDF beatings reported that most of the injuries resulted from blows carefully aimed to
fracture a bone); Yitzhmk Rebihiyeh, They Yelled at Ae: Say 'Givati Has Gaza by the
Balls,' Yediot Aharonot, Feb. 23, 1988, in Israeli League for Human and Civil Rights, Re-
port on the Violations of Human Rights in the Territories during the Uprising, 1988 53
(1988) (IDF soldiers reported that the IDF instructed soldiers to beat so as to fracture
bones).
51. Convention Relative to the Treatment of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug
12, 1949, art. 147, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 (defining "grave breach" as including "torture or in-
human treatment').
52. Beres, supra note 17, at 272.
53. Id.
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and extradition of terrorists." 
54
The doctrine of changed circumstances, or, as Professor Beres calls it in Latin,
the clausula rebus sic stantibus, allows a state to cease complying with a treaty if
circumstances have changed, but does not require it to do so. Thus, Professor
Beres' attempt to use the doctrine as requiring Israel to cease compliance is
groundless.
Further, his use of the doctrine to give Israel even a right of abrogation is dubi-
ous. The doctrine is recognized by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
(Article 62) and despite the lack of unanimity on the point, probably exists as a
doctrine of the customary law of treaties. According to the doctrine, a party is en-
titled to cease compliance with a treaty if the context existing at the time of the
agreement changes so radically that continued compliance seriously injures the
position of the party.56 Circumstances that give rise to a right to cease compliance
have never been clearly defined, however, and the doctrine rarely has been ap-
plied in practice.
One aspect of the doctrine is clear. The doctrine relates to changes in the fac-
tual context, not to acts by one of the parties.57 Thus, the doctrine has no applica-
bility in the situation posited by Professor Beres, namely, breaches by the P.L.O.
The doctrine Professor Beres should be invoking, and which he does refer to in
passing in the quoted language, is that of material breach. A state may cease com-
pliance with a bilateral treaty if the other party violates a provision essential to the
accomplishment of the object or purpose of the treaty.58 As to this point, Professor
Beres' argument is weakened by the facts he cites.
Professor Beres regards the P.L.O.'s failure to do enough to control anti-Israeli
terrorism as a material breach. In a controversial claim, he says that the P.L.O.
promotes terrorism by allowing the Hamas organization to operate freely in the
Gaza Strip.
59
Professor Beres' factual sources consist of opinion statements quoted from an
Israeli newspaper, the Jerusalem Post, a newspaper which shares Professor Beres'
perspective. He ignores the fact that the P.L.O. has carried out arrests so aggres-
sive in the wake of acts of violence against Jewish civilians, that it has been criti-
54. Id.
55. Edwin M. Smith, Understanding Dynamic Obligations: Arms, Control, Agree-
ments, 64 S. CAL. L. RFv. 1549, 1606 (1991).
56. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 20, art. 62:
A fundamental change of circumstances which has occurred with regard to those existing at the time
of the conclusion of a treaty, and which was not foreseen by the parties, may not be invoked as a
ground for terminating or withdrawing from the treaty unless: (a) the existence of those circumstances
constituted an essential basis of the consent of the parties to be bound by the treaty, and (b) the effect
of the change is radically to transform the extent of obligations still to be performed under the treaty.
57. See Smith, supra note 55, at 1606.
58. Id. art. 60.
59. Beres, supra note 17, at 273.
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cized by international human rights organizations.60 The information cited by
Professor Beres falls short of breach at a level of materiality that would allow Is-
rael to cease compliance.
4. NATIONAL SELF-PRESERVATION AS A BASIS FOR
ABROGATION
Professor Beres argues that "Israel's obligation to terminate the Oslo ac-
cords"61 derives also from a principle he calls "national self-preservation." "Un-
der this peremptory norm," he writes, "any agreement may be terminated unilat-
erally following changes in conditions that make performance of the agreement
injurious to fundamental rights, especially the rights of existence and independ-,,62
ence. Here again, Professor Beres has confused a condition that might allow
withdrawal with one that would mandate withdrawal. He refers to "national self-
preservation" as indicated, as obliging Israel to cease compliance with the Oslo
agreements. If there exists a principle of national self-preservation in the law of
treaties, it would at most allow a state to cease compliance.6
Further confusing the issue, Professor Beres refers to the supposed principle of
national self-preservation as a "peremptory norm." 65 The law of treaties does, to
be sure, include the idea of peremptory norms. The Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties defines a peremptory norm as one "accepted and recognized by
the international community of States as a whole as a norm from which no dero-
gation is permitted."
66
Thus, the doctrine operates with reference to initial validity of a treaty, not
with respect to subsequent experience with performance. Professor Beres appears
to be using it for the latter, because he speaks about continued performance be-67
coming self-destructive. On this basis, his reference to the concept of a peremp-
tory norm is misplaced.
Additionally, as one sees from the quoted definition of a peremptory norm, it is
a concept aimed at reventing a state from doing harm, not one aimed at allowing
it to protect itself. 6On this basis as well, Professor Beres' invocation of the con-
cept is misplaced. Beyond these difficulties, it is not clear that a doctrine of self-
60. Arafat's Dilemma, EcoiOm1rST, Mar. 2, 1996, at 40.
61. Beres, supra note 17, at 273.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. See BuRLEIGH CUSHimG RODIC, Tim DocurNE op NEcEssrry iN Immi'RATioNAL
LAw 44 (1928) (noting that self-preservation and development of a nation are the core du-
ties of every state and if treaty obligations are in conflict with the necessary development
of a state the former must give 'xry).
65. Beres, supra note 17, at 273.
66. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 20, art. 53.
67. Beres, supra note 17, at 274.
68. See T.O.ELiAs, MoDEILAW OFTREATmS 170-74, 177-87 (1974).
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preservation exists in the law of treaties as a ground for ceasing compliance. It is
not mentioned in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, nor in its sub-
section on grounds for termination.
Finally, Professor Beres employs a weak factual basis for invoking this sup-
posed doctrine. His idea is that the Oslo agreements jeopardize Israel's security to
such an extent that either permits or obligates Israel to terminate participation in
the agreements. Again, the only source he uses is an opinion piece from the Jeru-
salem Post.69 Other writers have argued with much plausibility that the Oslo
agreements enhance Israel's security. 'u Israel has had problems trying to hold the
Gaza Strip and West Bank, so giving them up does not take Israel from an obvi-
ously stronger to an obviously weaker position. As long as Israel occupies these
two areas, it cannot expect peace with its neighbors. Peace with the Palestinians is
the only way in which Israel can hope to maintain decent relations in the long
term, not only with its immediate neighbors, but with the rest of the world.
5. RELEASE OF PRISONERS
A particular provision in the Oslo agreements that Professor Beres finds un-
lawful is Israel's commitment, undertaken in the 1994 interim agreement, to re-
lease five thousand Palestinian prisoners.71 The 1994 agreement referred to these
prisoner releases as a "confidence building measure." Professor Beres says that
Israel violated international law by carrying the provisions out "because some of
the jailed terrorists had committed crimes against other states as well as against
Israel, and the government in Jerusalem cannot possibly pardon these offenses
against other sovereigns. The Jewish State, therefore, possesses absolutely no
right to grant immunity for terrorist violations of international law. No matter
what might be permissible under its own Basic Law and the Oslo accords, any
freeing of terrorists is legally incorrect. By its freeing of terrorists, Israel is guilty
of what is known in law as a 'denial ofjustice."' '72
Professor Beres misconceives the nature of the releases. In the quoted language
he calls them on one occasion pardons, on another a grant of immunity. In fact
the releases were neither. Israel did not pardon these prisoners, i.e., declare their
innocence. Nor did it grant immunity, which would have meant a decision not to
sanction them in the first place. What Israel did was release these prisoners prior
to the expiration of their sentences, which is more in the nature of a commuta-
tion.7
3
69. Beres, supra note 17, at 274.
70. John V. Whitbeck, Israeli security requires a Palestinian state, MIDDLE EAST
INm., Oct. 25, 1996, at 19.
71. Beres, supra note 17, at 272.
72. Id. Professor Beres here misuses the term "denial of justice," which refers to a
failure by a government to accord due process to an alien in criminal proceedings. 1
OPPENrIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW 543-45 (R. Jennings & A. Watts eds. 1992).
73. See Daniel T. Kobil, Do the Paperwork or Die: Clemency, Ohio Style? 52 Oino
ST. L. J. 655, 661 (1991) (discussing limited nature of commutation as merely imposing a
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Even if a state is obliged to try persons who have committed terrorism offenses,
it would not necessarily violate that obligation by releasing them before the end of
their sentence. Early release is practiced in many states, either on the basis of the
rehabilitation of the individual, or for a variety of other reasons.
Professor Beres' broad brush characterization of the released prisoners as ter-
rorists is dubious. He provides no information on the types of offenses for which
these prisoners were convicted. To the extent that the offenses involved violence,
he does not distinguish between violence aimed at civilians, and violence directed
at military targets. The latter might qualify as lawful activity in pursuit of national
liberation, while the former might violate the norms of humanitarian law, but
would not necessarily be terrorist.
Further, Professor Beres assumes without discussion that the released prisoners
were in fact guilty of the crimes of which they were convicted. This assumption is
doubtful, given the serious criticism of the military courts in which they were
tried.74 Particular criticism has focused on interrogation practices, inasmuch as a
major item of evidence in most of the trials leading to conviction of Palestinians
on security-related offenses is a confession. Israel has authorized its interrogators
to use physical force in interrogating Palestinians on security-related charges, and
while it denies that such force constitutes torture as internationally defined, its po-
sition in that regard is incorrect.75 Israel has a formal policy that condones prac-
tices that are defined under international standards as torture.76 Even if the physi-
cal force were to fall short of torture, a confession gained would not necessarily be
voluntary. The questionable character of the convictions further weakens Profes-
sor Beres' unlawful release argument.
6. THE ISRAELI-P.L.O. NEGOTIATIONS ON A FINAL STATUS
For Israel, the Oslo agreements do not represent a bad bargain. Israel keeps the
territory it took in 1948 and reaps the rewards of the ethnic cleansing it carried
out at that time. The accommodation with the Palestinians opens the way to peace
treaties with Syria and Lebanon, which, along with peace treaties already signed
with Egypt and Jordan, will leave Israel in a state of peace with all its immediate
neighbors for the first time.
Even if Israel were to accede to the maximal Palestinian position on all the fi-
nal status issues, Israel would still be in a better position than that to which it is
legally entitled. If Israel gave Jerusalem (east and west) to the Palestine state, if it
withdrew all its settlers, and if it repatriated all the displaced Palestinians, it
lesser penalty in substitution for the original punishment).
74. Jordan J. Paust et al., Report of the ICI Mission of Inquiry into the Military Court
System in the Occupied West Bank and Gaza, 14 HASTINGS Ihn'L & CO.MP. L. REv. I
(1990).
75. John Quigley, International Limits on Use of Force to Elicit Confessions: A Cri-
tique oflsrael's Policy on Interrogation, 14 BRooKLYNI. I,'LL. 485-502 (1988).
76. B'Trsam, LEorre =znGToRTURe: TEISRAEu HIGH COURT OF JusTicE RULUOS IN
THE BmBEs4 HAmDANA MtMBARAK CASES: ANANNOTATED SoURcEBooK (1997).
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would still not have restored the status quo prior to its unlawful actions of 1948.
The question is not whether Israel must or should abrogate the Oslo agreements.
The question is whether the Oslo agreements and, more importantly, the agree-
ment that emerges from the final status negotiations, protect the rights of the Pal-
estinians. This is what the international community must ensure, given the pre-
ponderance of power on the Israeli side. If Palestinian rights are not protected,
U.N. organs may be forced to carry the Palestine question on their agendas for an-
other half century.
